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ABSTRACT 
The paper dissects the intricacies of Automated Decision Making 
(ADM) and urges for refining the current legal definition of AI 
when pinpointing the role of algorithms in the advent of 
ubiquitous computing, data analytics and deep learning. ADM 
relies upon a plethora of algorithmic approaches and has already 
found a wide range of applications in marketing automation, 
social networks, computational neuroscience, robotics, and other 
fields. Our main aim here is to explain how a thorough 
understanding of the layers of ADM could be a first good step 
towards this direction: AI operates on a formula based on several 
degrees of automation employed in the interaction between the 
programmer, the user, and the algorithm; this can take various 
shapes and thus yield different answers to key issues regarding 
agency. The paper offers a fresh look at the concept of “Machine 
Intelligence”, which exposes certain vulnerabilities in its current 
legal interpretation. Most importantly, it further helps us to 
explore whether the argument for “artificial personhood” holds 
any water. To highlight this argument, analysis proceeds in two 
parts: Part 1 strives to provide a taxonomy of the various levels of 
automation that reflects distinct degrees of Human – Machine 
interaction and can thus serve as a point of reference for outlining 
distinct rights and obligations of the programmer and the 
consumer: driverless cars are used as a case study to explore the 
several layers of human and machine interaction. These different 
degrees of automation reflect various levels of complexities in the 
underlying algorithms, and pose very interesting questions in 
terms of agency and dynamic tasks carried out by software agents. 
Part 2 further discusses the intricate nature of the underlying 
algorithms and artificial neural networks (ANN) that implement 
them and considers how one can interpret and utilize observed 
patterns in acquired data. Is “artificial personhood” a sufficient 
legal response to highly sophisticated machine learning 
techniques employed in decision making that successfully emulate 
or even enhance human cognitive abilities? 
CCS CONCEPTS 
• Applied Computing → Law, Social and Behavioral 
Sciences→ Law • Computing Methodologies → Machine 
Learning → Machine Learning Algorithms 
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Machine Learning, ANN, Personhood hybrids, algorithmic 
agency 
 
ACM Reference format: 
A.P.Karanasiou, D.A.Pinotsis. 2017. SIG Proceedings Paper in word 
Format. In Proceedings of ICAIL ’17, London, UK, June 2017, 10 pages 
DOI: 10.1145/3086512.3086524 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The great advances that have occurred in machine learning 
research in the past four decades have led to a rapid 
commercialization of AI assisted systems, whose applications are 
nowadays indispensable parts of one’s everyday life: Virtual 
Personal Assistants like Apple’s Siri or Microsoft’s Cortana, 
driverless cars and smart thermostats are only a few examples to a 
rapidly expanding list. An important component of these 
applications is Automated Decision Making (ADM), that is, the 
ability of algorithms to provide solutions in tasks with ambiguous 
outcomes and determine the optimal among a set of possible 
answers. In light of these developments, this paper attempts to 
provide an overview of the various layers of algorithmic 
determinism in automated and semi-automated tasks. Our hope is 
that this analysis could serve as a useful point of reference for 
assessing the frequently suggested arguments towards a potential 
legal personification of software agents.  
 In 2016, Microsoft released an artificial application into the 
online social sphere: a ChatBot called Tay.ai, which was designed 
to interact with Twitter users and learn from these interactions. 
Within 24 hours, Microsoft had to deactivate Tay’s Twitter 
account, due to a large amount of retweets of racism comments on 
Tay’s feed, often including further offensive commentary by the 
ChatBot (Perez 2016). Although such racial commentary is not 
unusual online (Williams et al, 2016), the case of Tay is of 
particular interest given that it provides empirical evidence of 
advanced forms of AI that is able to mimic human behavior. This 
interaction between the machine and the human is an intricate 
process that includes various degrees of automation, which in turn 
result from mixing together the user feedback with the algorithm’s 
behavior.   
This of course opens the door to a plethora of ethical and 
safety considerations with regards to using AI technologies 
without abusing the power these might yield over human agents. 
When the AI research firm DeepMind was acquired by Google in 
2014, one of the prerequisites was to set up an ethics board 
dealing with these issues. After all, the recent win of the 
company’s system AlphaGo over a high level human player 
proves the need for a code of ethics. Lately however, further 
concerns have also been voiced as to the legal and ethical 
treatment of advanced AI applications that effectively require 
limited supervision or are even able to operate without the need 
for “the human in the loop”.  Indicative of the latter is the EU 
Legal Affairs Committee’s vote for a resolution in January 2017, 
which calls for a detailed legislative framework regarding smart 
autonomous systems. Among other points, the proposal urges for 
a wider definition of AI, including smart systems either comprised 
a physical support or connected to a software program without 
being embedded in a physical support. Largely based at a draft 
report prepared by MEP Mady Delvaux in 2016, it is expected to 
further discuss the prospect of considering rendering a “specific 
legal status” for robots. As noted in the report, "At least the most 
sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as having 
the status of electronic persons with specific rights and 
obligations, including that of making good any damage they may 
cause". Thus, an electronic personality could also be applied "to 
cases where robots make smart autonomous decisions or 
otherwise interact with third parties independently". The purpose 
of this paper is to discuss this proposition in further detail and 
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assess its validity: are we ready to introduce “hybrid” personhood 
rights?  
The question of how real and simulated intelligence measure 
up in AI is hardly a new one (for a good overview see Haugeland 
1985). Note for example Chomsky’s reading of the Alan Turing 
test (Turing 1950) as an approach that separates the cognitive 
from the biological elements in order to provide an answer as to 
whether machines can be perceived by humans as able to think, 
not different to fooling someone into believing the “submarines 
can swim” (Chomsky, 1996). This, Chomsky concludes, is a 
“question of decision, not a question of fact”, not different to 
fooling someone into believing the “submarines can swim”.   
This interpretation of “intelligence” lies at the heart of the 
argument put forth here: to legally assess Automated Decision 
Making, one needs to go beyond the realm of biological and 
cognitive abilities and consider the essence of the concept of 
“personhood”: what defines a person and when is a person 
autonomous? In other words, the level of autonomy displayed by 
the agent or the machine will also determine the level of liability, 
which is currently a puzzling notion for legal scholars addressing 
AI. To highlight this point, the paper uses driverless cars as a case 
study and explains how fully automated systems bestow upon us 
the task to develop our theorizing in order to accommodate 
artificial agents within legal doctrines. As it will be shown in the 
remainder of the paper, the matter of “intelligence” in AI is not 
merely of philosophical nature but its definition is much needed to 
provide solid grounding for emergent legal issues, such as tortious 
liability (Chopra & White, 2011). The latter is of course a legal 
convention, which provides us with a safe tool to address 
challenging issues in automated systems (i.e. liability in driverless 
cars) but is not on its own enough to account for the 
reconfiguration of key concepts, such as causation and 
responsibility.   
Moving away from Chomsky’s narrow interpretation of the 
Turing test, Russell and Norvig (2003) draw an interesting 
distinction between an artefact’s behavior and an artefacts 
pedigree: "we can conclude that in some cases, the behavior of an 
artefact is important, while in others it is the artefact’s pedigree 
that matters. Which one is important in which case seems to be a 
matter of convention. But for artificial minds, there is no 
convention". This explains the focal point of this paper, which 
revolves around the personhood of artificial agents. As such, our 
aim here is to go beyond the mere confinements of torts and 
contracts and to canvass a rights-based framework for highly 
sophisticated machine learning algorithms employed in ADM. As 
it will be shown next, although to a certain extent we do not lack 
the legal tools to address issues of liability in automated systems, 
deep learning has added two extra parameters to the equation that 
have complicated matters:  
  
(i) The pedigree of the artefact is the result of an opaque 
computational procedure to resemble human cognitive behavior 
that is dynamic and evolving. Of course, automated systems as 
such are hardly a novelty: take for example the UAV (unmanned 
aerial vehicles), which have been in use since 1900s in military 
training. The novelty here is that –unlike UAVs- the human 
involvement is now from within the “black box”: a driverless 
vehicle does not lack a driver but it is rather the driver that is not 
required to be fully alerted or to participate at all times.  
  
(ii) The behavior of the artefact is the result of a combination of 
several layers of interaction between the human and the artificial 
agent. Again, the intricate part here is not the interaction with the 
machine as such; for more than fifty years now, Brain Computer 
Interface (BCI) research has been considering the applications of 
such a symbiotic relationship in areas, such as neuro-prosthetics. 
But what is striking here, is that the technological advancements 
in Machine Learning have uncovered various degrees of 
interaction between the man and the machine, which at times can 
be hard to identify and rationalize.    
 
To elucidate such intricacies, the following section provides an 
overview of ADM and its mechanics, namely some related 
machine learning algorithms and the current trend towards deep 
learning. 
 
2 A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF 
EMERGENT NORMATIVE AND LEGAL 
ASPECTS IN AUTOMATED SYSTEMS: THE 
INTRICACIES OF MACHINE LEARNING 
ALGORITHMS 
 
The aim of this section is to first establish an understanding of 
the technical context, within which ADM occurs. This will not 
only allow us to explain better how a definition of “intelligence” 
in AI (pedigree) is somewhat elusive but it will also provide a 
solid methodological grounding, given that the approach taken 
here is a techno-legal overview of automated systems. Recent 
advances in machine learning and computational complexity 
theory have been further boosted by the ability to collect, 
manipulate and store vast amounts of data. ADM is a natural 
product of these exciting developments and has found a wide 
range of applications in seemingly unrelated fields like marketing 
automation, social networks, computational neuroscience, 
robotics, banking, transportation and others. 
      Machine learning algorithms often employ artificial neural 
networks (ANNs). This means that the computational units these 
algorithms use to perform intelligent functions resemble 
biological networks and neurons. ANNs take advantage of 
powerful algorithms that are trained using large datasets available 
in many industries (image databases, security or healthcare 
records, traffic or consumer behavior data, online platform 
analytics, etc.) so that they can correctly decide upon suitable 
actions when new data are presented to them in a similar way to 
what a human agent would do; for example to recognize faces or 
operate driverless cars. The purpose of ADM is to be able to act 
without the need of human intervention. They are be able to deal 
with novel conditions, that is take the right decision even when 
the dataset presented to them is different from the one they have 
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been trained on, e.g. a driverless car should be able to navigate in 
a road it has not had access before. 
How do ANN algorithms learn to perform complicated tasks 
efficiently? Put simply, the answer lies in exploiting both 
increased computational power and vast amounts of data already 
collected. This data is used by the programmer to train the 
algorithm. Technically, training is often done in one of the 
following three ways: supervised, unsupervised or reinforcement 
learning, see e.g. (Mohri et al., 2012). These are technical terms 
that relate to  the details of the training process and  are distinct 
from potential interactions with the user after the algorithm is 
passed on to her in e.g. human-in-the-loop and similar 
applications.  
Supervised learning (SL) occurs when during training the 
algorithm is fed with both an input and the correct decision 
(output). For example, when the algorithm has to distinguish 
between faces and objects in a scene, the input would be an image 
and the output a class index, e.g. 1 for faces and 2 for objects. The 
algorithm is then given pairs of images and class indices that are 
used to fine tune its parameters. The algorithm has to find the 
correct class index when – after learning- it is presented with a 
new image that may or may not contain a face (Nakajima et al, 
2000).  
Unsupervised learning (UL) is quite similar conceptually. 
Using the above simple example, the difference is that the 
algorithm would have to guess whether the image contains a face 
or not without being explicitly given the corresponding indices 
during the training process (Kumar et al., 2010). Of course, when 
designed, the algorithm is fed with some information about the 
task, e.g. it would know it should decide between two possible 
alternatives, however it is not given which images contain faces 
and which do not, it has to discover these differences based on 
certain features that the images might contain, e.g. eyes, nose and 
mouth at close proximity in all images that contain faces. In a 
more difficult scenario, the algorithm might even have to decide 
how many classes or categories there might be in the data, 
something that might lead to it over- or under-estimating this 
number. In such clustering or classification tasks the algorithm 
puts together points that are related in some conceptual space. Of 
course, the dimensions of this space (which features should be 
selected) are crucial for making the algorithm efficient and are 
chosen by the programmer in the design stage. This is important 
as it might introduce a bias in the output of the decision process: 
depending on what features the programmer chooses to be 
important, the algorithm might take different decisions. We call 
this the “bias” introduced by the programmer to the ADM 
algorithm. The reader should keep this term in mind as we will 
come back to it in section 4.2 below. Bias is not only an issue in 
unsupervised learning but also in other machine learning 
approaches like Reinforcement Learning to which we now turn:  
Reinforcement learning (RL) is slightly more complicated: it 
decouples actions from rewards and the algorithm aims not at 
taking the “right” action (decision), but maximizing the reward it 
receives (Sutton and Barto, 1998). This is merely a technical 
distinction that renders the description of the relevant algorithms 
slightly more complicated – for example, the algorithm might 
have to take several actions one after the other to maximize an end 
goal (reward). Interestingly, this decoupling speaks to the ability 
of the algorithm to take sequential decisions that are related to 
each other and think ahead in time; for example, the DeepMind 
algorithm that plays the Atari game Breakout should find a 
balance between the time it spends at each location firing and the 
speed it moves if it wants to accumulate sufficient reward (high 
score) and successfully proceed to the next level (Mnih et al., 
2015). Furthermore, this balance might change in time or as the 
level of the game advances. Contrary to the other two approaches, 
the emphasis in RL is in combining several decisions (or actions) 
to get the most benefit out of them. In other words, reward is a 
complicated function of two or more decisions that might be 
unknown even to the programmer, let alone the user herself.  
RL is today considered to be a promising avenue for building 
intelligent algorithms that can adapt to different environments and 
even tasks; an important limitation in older machine learning 
approaches was the lack of flexibility: e.g. an algorithm might 
learn to play chess at master level but would be unable to play 
checkers, which for most human players that know the rules chess 
would be easy to pick up. This is why algorithms are often trained 
to perform within a limited set of conditions and cannot succeed 
when rules changes, even slightly. In a paper published last year, 
DeepMind researchers showed that the same algorithm could 
perform well in several Atari games without being trained in each 
one individually (Minh et al., 2015) Essentially, the algorithm 
learns different mappings between actions and rewards online and 
is able to flexibly maximize the benefit it receives when the 
environment (game) changes.  
All three learning approaches have a long history in machine 
learning, however recent successes like the DeepMind algorithm 
for playing Atari games discussed above followed technical 
advances sometimes referred to collectively as Deep Learning 
(DL). For example, the DeepMind work uses Deep-Q Learning 
which is a combination of RL and DL (Van Hasselt et al., 2015). 
Roughly speaking, the term “Deep” here refers to increasing the 
power (and complexity) of an algorithm by taking its basic 
constituent parts and using them recursively, that is feeding the 
output of one part to the other. Crucially, each part uses a similar 
learning process, however only after combining all parts together 
is the system (building a deep architecture) able to perform well. 
If the architecture of the algorithm is changed, e.g. a smaller 
number of constituent parts are used, then the algorithm might not 
be able to take the right decision of find the action that maximize 
its reward.  
Architectural details like e.g. the exact number of parts (layers) 
in the system or how “big” each part should be in terms of how 
many computational units should be used are often found by 
experience. This is in contrast with older approaches and rule-
based simulations where the algorithms were implemented in 
much smaller computer infrastructures and the role of different 
computational elements involved was more transparent. 
Interestingly, it might not be a principled explanation as to why 
certain deep (extended) architectures work and others don’t 
ICAIL ’17, June 2017, London UK. A. Karanasiou et al. 
 
4 
 
something often referred to as the deep algorithms being 
somehow “opaque”. This idea has its roots in neuroscience where 
a succession of brain areas – e.g. the ventral system- plays a 
similar role to a deep network architecture. In this setting, certain 
brain areas situated away from sensory regions light up and 
respond to different stimuli e.g. some areas respond to faces and 
others to objects. This means that these areas are sensitive to the 
category of the visual stimuli and can distinguish between 
categories. Crucially, earlier (visual) areas would respond to 
anything placed in the visual field regardless of its category. 
However, only higher areas that receive input from several 
upstream regions are able to distinguish between different 
categories of visual stimuli. In brief, the brain decides about the 
category of the stimulus by combining signals from several areas 
that interact in a large network. Similarly, it is only after the 
programmer endows its algorithm with several parts and builds a 
“deep” hierarchical architecture that the algorithm can distinguish 
between classes of visual stimuli. 
 So what have we lost by making the algorithm deep? Maybe 
we have found a way to replace humans with intelligent agents 
that can perform well and take the right decisions; however, we 
cannot claim that the algorithm really understands or interprets its 
input the way a human would do. This poses an interesting 
challenge for law, and in particular regarding the concept of 
“agency”, as deep algorithms have the ability to act upon their 
input, e. g. take a decision. In this case, the definition of “act” is 
stretched beyond the narrow confinements of conventional legal 
formalism; algorithms do not serve as mere tools but are able to 
take well informed decisions under little or no supervision at all.   
Most importantly, there exists an additional dimension that 
further muddles the waters for legally assessing ADM: what is the 
scope for the user’s involvement in the decision process? Given 
the complexity in the process of decision making, a clear 
understanding of the interactions between the machine and the 
human agent is necessary not only for attributing responsibility 
for the outcome of the decision met but further to explore the 
causality, intent and risk assessment. Take for example the law of 
negligence, a tort introduced partly in response to the problems of 
agency: direct liability would only apply in supervised systems, 
whereas indirect liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior 
would require a certain level of foreseeability, namely 
“normalized expectations for the technical capacities of computer 
action” (Teubner, 2007).   
In applications that require a human-in-the-loop like Brain 
Computer Interface (BCI), assisted Decision Making and Health 
Informatics the user already plays an active role in this process. In 
such cases, the user acts supplementary to the algorithm and 
interacts with it. This leads to increased performance and 
efficiency of the algorithm and good performance even in 
situations of high uncertainty or increased risk. What makes 
human-in-the-loop algorithms different to autonomous systems is 
not the way training is carried out but the possibility of human 
intervention at intermediate stages of the training process. The 
human intervenes to enhance the algorithm’s performance by 
bringing in knowledge the algorithm has no access to. 
Intermediate training follows the general procedures we have 
described above  but the user has a decisive role in selecting new 
training datasets that have been preprocessed by her, e.g. throw 
irrelevant parts  away or intervene at intermediate stages to  assess 
the quality of results produced  and guide  the algorithm 
accordingly. For example, in (Awasthi et al.,2015) an algorithm 
used limited supervision to cluster data in a certain number of 
groups with the help of the user who  at each stage told the 
algorithm whether it should split or merge some of it.  
Thus far we have discussed the technical details underlying 
machine learning algorithms used in ADM. These summarize 
what we earlier called the artefact’s pedigree.  In the following 
section, we focus on the artefact’s behavior and use driverless cars 
as a case study to explore the various levels of automation: this 
allows us to gain a better understanding of various degrees of 
human-machine interaction, which will serve as a reference point 
for the remainder of the paper and shall aid us in our quest to 
understand the balance between the algorithm’s inner workings – 
that are often opaque – and human intervention. 
 3 A TAXONOMY OF AUTOMATION 
LAYERS: DRIVERLESS CARS AS A CASE 
STUDY 
 
The prospect of fully autonomous vehicles “designed to be 
capable of safely competing journeys without the need for a 
driver” (Department for Transport Code of Practice) has certainly 
gained momentum in the past few years: Google Chauffeur 
software currently tested in autonomous vehicles in California, 
Rio Tinto’s autonomous haulage systems operating since 2008 in 
Australia or Volvo’s pioneering program “Drive me” expected to 
release autonomous vehicles to customers in Gothenburg by 2017 
are a few indicative cases of the great potential automated systems 
have shown in the transport industry (Atkins 2015). This however 
is far from removing drivers completely “off the loop”, although 
many manufacturers have already introduced semi-automated 
vehicles with driving assistance features, such as controlling the 
brake, throttle and steering, supporting active lane-keeping or 
using sensors to deliver full speed adaptive cruise control (KPMG 
2013).   
It is thus apparent that automated systems, such as autonomous 
vehicles, operate on several different degrees of automation, 
according to how much control is yielded to the driver. In other 
words, the novel element here is not automation per se but the 
variety of degrees of interaction between the man and the 
machine. Take for example the case study of driverless cars 
explored here:  automated driving is not really a striking fact 
nowadays; the auto-mobile started replacing the horse-drawn 
carriages in the turn of the 20th century. The initial skepticism 
towards the new risks posed by the technological advances was 
followed by gradual adoption of the new means of transport, 
mainly due to the codification of automated driving in law (Moris, 
2007). Transport related legal issues, mainly liability, have been 
dealt with a dynamic body of regulations at a national and 
international level, which have taken an anthropocentric view: 
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assumption of risk, bad judgement, and reasonable foreseeability, 
are a few grounds upon which causality can be established. At the 
same time, they all have one common point of departure: human 
error as a sine qua non of the decision making process.   
 The elimination of human error is however also one of the key 
elements behind the rapid evolution of the self-driving car 
industry. A 2008 NHTSA report attributes 40% of collisions to 
“recognition errors”, caused by distractions, and 35% to “decision 
errors”, such as speeding. It is thus expected that removing the 
human element from driving will enhance road safety (NHTSA, 
2008). Recent progress in computer vision like the use of 
massively parallel graphic processing units and deep learning 
algorithms have led to a revolution in the field of driverless cars. 
The quest for self-driving vehicles was initiated with DARPA’s 
Grand Challenges: this was a competition among such vehicles 
where external operators were allowed to intervene in the 
vehicles’ route to minimize risk and ensure safety (e.g. by 
stopping and restarting the vehicles). Since then, several 
milestones have been reached and fully autonomous driving has 
become a reality (Urmson et al., 2008; Levinson et al., 2011; 
2014; Wei et al., 2013). Of course, due to the complexity and 
breadth of possible driving conditions, achieving fully 
autonomous cars that  have sufficient training so that they are able 
to perform well in any situation is far from solved (despite using 
huge training datasets, that include millions of highway and road 
images etc.). However, extending basic computer vision 
algorithms to the level of replacing human agents is now 
considered viable and several reports of self-driving cars have 
appeared in the media, e.g. (Rosen, R.,2012; Hull, L., 2013).  
Thus, it is not the technology or the externalities it 
unavoidably creates that hinder our legal understanding of 
automated decision making. What is challenging for legal minds, 
is an unprecedented variety of interfaces and levels of interaction 
between the human and a machine learning algorithm. To put it 
differently, to fully assess  these algorithms one will have to 
perceive to what extent the human element (directly by human-in 
the-loop interventions or indirectly at the design stage) is present 
in the “intelligence” demonstrated by the algorithm. As noted in 
section 2 above, it is imperative that a basic taxonomy for ADM is 
adopted prior to any legal evaluation to enhance our 
understanding of how each “automated” task involves constant 
shifts of roles from executing to merely supervising (Sheridan 
1970).   
The study of these interactions has given rise to many theories 
discussing ontological and deontological approaches regarding 
automated functions and the degree of human involvement (Fitts 
1951). As a result, many taxonomies of various degrees of 
automation have been suggested in a quest to localize 
informational control in the human or automaton domain: 
Sheridan and Verplank’s ten degrees of automation (1978) are 
probably the most widely adopted theory that describes variations 
of control from human to collaborative and to fully automated, 
Endsley and Kaber’s theory (1999) emphasizes on supported, 
blended or automated decision making, whereas Riley’s taxonomy 
(1989) uses a mixed assessment based on various levels of 
autonomy that intersect with different degrees of intelligence. 
These theories have provided the ground for authorities such as 
the NHTSA or the Society of Automobile Engineers to identify 5 
levels of automation in computer assisted driving:    
  
(i) No-Automation (Level 0), i.e. the system automatically 
assists the driver to regain lost control of the vehicle.  
(ii)  Function-specific Automation (Level 1), i.e. the system 
controls one function.   
(iii) Combined Function Automation (Level 2), i.e. the system 
controls at least two functions.  
(iv) Limited Self-Driving Automation (Level 3), i.e. the driver 
cedes full control under specific conditions,   
(v) Full Self-Driving Automation (Level 4), i.e. the driver is 
not expected to become involved throughout the duration 
of the trip.  
 
Further to this, the NHTSA Federal Automated Vehicles 
Policy published in September 2016 by the US Department of 
Transportation, outlines in more detail the term “highly automated 
vehicle” (HAV), which represents SAE Levels 3-5 vehicles with 
automated systems that are responsible for monitoring the driving 
environment. This variety of human – machine interaction 
introduces a new complexity: “the vehicle must be capable of 
accurately conveying information to the human driver regarding 
intentions and vehicle performance”, as well as to its 
environment, namely “other external actors with whom the HAV 
may have interactions (other vehicles, pedestrians, etc.)”. To put 
this differently, it does matter whether the average observer can 
tell whether a vehicle is autonomous or not, as this changes the 
degree of reliance towards the ability of a driver to maneuver and 
shapes reasonable expectations accordingly. This is particularly 
interesting when one considers Level 3 SAE systems, which are 
expected to be monitored by the driver, although human capacity 
to stay alert when disengaged from the driving task may be 
limited.   
Driverless cars are a recent example where automated systems 
have made great progress and reached a level, where the operator 
can be completely ignored. Earlier examples include aviation 
(Spizer, 1987) and medicine (Thompson, 1994), leading up to the 
emergence of the DoNotPay Bot in 2016, the world’s first “robot 
lawyer”, offering free legal advice to the homeless. We have 
chosen to discuss driverless cars in the paper, as the various 
degrees of automation discussed above, capture perfectly this 
interplay between the operator and the agent. As Sheridan notes 
“Automation has moved from open-loop mechanization of 
industrial revolution, then to simple closed loop linear control, 
then to non-linear and adaptive control and recently to a mic of 
crisp and fuzzy rule-based decision, neural nets and generic 
algorithms that truly recognize patterns and learn” (Sheridan 
2000). This in turn has also marked a shift from automated ML 
(aML) to interactive ML (iML) (Holzinger, 2016), namely an 
almost seamless interaction between the machine and the 
operator. The more sophisticated the system is, the more it 
changes the nature of human performance, challenging thereby 
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our understanding of who the operator of a given task is, and to 
what extent she needs to apply own cognitive capacities 
(Parasuraman, 1997). From a legal standpoint, this is highly 
problematic as such interactions lend anthropomorphic traits to 
otherwise automatically executed tasks. In a similar vein, Calo 
(2015) outlines three distinctive features in robotics that blend the 
boundaries between the human and the machine: embodiment of 
the algorithm (e.g. the car in our case study), emergence (the 
“coupling of complexity and usefulness”) and social valence, 
namely the public reliance on automated systems. Ultimately, he 
concludes that new juridical insights will be required to fully 
perceive this emerging field from a legal viewpoint and accurately 
evaluate to what extend automated systems can be treated as 
social actors, able to “think” for us  after having benefited from 
our social experiences. This echoes Teubner (2007), who having 
reviewed Luhmann and Latour, explains how most legal actors are 
created by social attribution, without the need to possess any 
ontological human properties, such as reflexive capacities or 
empathy. That said, artificial agents are still beyond the narrow 
confinements of our current anthropocentric view of legal actors.    
Can autonomous cars drive us, in the same sense that 
submarines can swim? So far we have focused on how advances 
in machine learning have led to highly sophisticated automated 
systems that can potentially throw the operator out-of-the-loop. 
To understand this better, let us take the Google driverless car as 
an example and focus on how it can operate with minimal 
supervision. The Google algorithm for driverless cars performs 
the following   operations:  
(i) self-localization using 3D map technologies  
(ii) determination of static and moving obstacles  
(iii) classification of information/objects by using machine vision  
(iv) generation of road condition predictions  
(v) evaluation of these predictions against real circumstances  
(vi) automated actions like steering, braking or accelerating, if 
required (Titiriga, 2016).  
These are the same operations a human driver would have to 
undertake; however the sense of agency is in this case different: 
what do notions like “average reasonable person”, “free will”, 
“mens rea” and degrees of culpability mean in the case of 
driverless cars? Such questions present us with an “indirect 
agency”, a status which is not easy to assess legally using 
frequently evoked criteria.  
Let us then consider each of the above steps independently: in 
operations (ii) and (iii) the algorithm has to perform image and 
object recognition, segmentation and classification. Given the 
limited degree of automation in the decision making process, it 
can be argued that these steps correspond to levels 0-2, in the SAE 
taxonomy mentioned above. In other words, the algorithm has to 
first understand how many objects exist in its view and then 
classify them into pedestrians, cars, traffic lights etc. This means 
that the algorithm has to boost interesting parts of the image over 
not so interesting ones; for example, be able to distinguish 
between a pedestrian standing next to a still or obscure 
background, e.g. a traffic light at a crossing or in a pavement with 
low lighting. Segmentation is then carried out using some sensors 
(cameras, lasers etc.) that should be able to learn new 
environments in an unsupervised way (Levinson, J., & Thrun, S., 
2014).  In this context, recognition and classification of human 
and objects in the car’s proximity might go beyond simple 
processing of visual input through the car’s camera and applying 
labels to objects using a database stored in the car: they might 
require autonomous interactions with electronic systems and 
databases outside the vehicle like GPS-based guidance systems 
and information from the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
that would allow the algorithm to localize the vehicle and its 
neighboring objects and surroundings (Zhu,J., et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, information about the car’s location and other 
parameters (speed, direction etc.) should be passed on to a central 
(global) guidance system and database at a remote location, e.g. 
DOT so that other (neighboring) vehicles might be informed 
about the car’s trajectory and parameters.  
Operations (iv)-(vi) above are more complicated and as such, 
correspond to SAE levels 3 – 5 (see Figure 1 above): on top of 
image processing and computer vision tasks, the algorithm of the 
driverless car has to solve an inherently dynamic problem where 
on top of image processing the algorithm has also to predict 
trajectories in time, both its own and neighboring cars e.g. predict 
the future location of the car in the front given its speed to avoid 
collision in case it breaks unexpectedly. It also has to generate 
appropriate steering commands, breaking, acceleration and  be 
able to associate past and future driving conditions, e.g. if the 
ground map includes information about a congested road coming 
up the algorithm could look for alternative routes or try to slow 
down even though obstacles might not be directly visible. All 
these operations endow the algorithm with a novel sense of 
agency as it effectively acts in lieu of a driver and behaves like 
one. What are the criteria for legally assessing this new sort of 
agency?   
This question does not suggest that automated vehicles operate 
on a legal vacuum. On the contrary, the issue of liability has been 
debated many times at a national, federal and international level 
and although incoherent, most solutions suggested in the 
regulatory domain move towards strict liability. Given however 
the different types of driverless cars (reflecting various shades of 
automation), there is no size that fits all:  Volvo, for instance has 
declared that the company will pay for any damages caused by its 
fully autonomous IntelliSafe Autopilot system. With regards to 
Google’s car, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) has recognized that the software, not the human, is the 
driver. At the same time though, the international Vienna 
Convention on Road Traffic gives responsibility for the car to the 
driver, requiring that “[e]very driver shall at all times be able to 
control his vehicle”. The amendment to Vienna Convention, 
which came into effect in 2016, to include article 8 paragraph 5bis 
VC, does little in clarifying matters regarding autonomous 
vehicles: as it is premised on the assumption that such automated 
systems can be overridden by the driver, it does not take into 
account fully automated systems. Far from establishing legal 
certainty, the current regulative framework regarding automated 
vehicles is still dispersed and in working progress. At the same 
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time, the issue of agency is barely addressed, mainly due to the 
challenging issue of proving actual causation in automated 
technology (Wittenberg, 2016). Next, follows an attempt to 
understand the agent’s artificial “intelligence” through the lens of 
personhood – a doctrinal approach beyond the strict confines of 
liability.   
 
4 Deep Learning Conundrums: The Emergence of 
“Assimilated Personhood” in ADM Algorithms. 
 
At this point, let us pause for an intermediate summary: so far, 
we have attempted to provide a descriptive (section 2) and 
normative analysis (section 3) of machine learning algorithms. 
These analyses have validated the hypothesis set out in the 
introduction, that ADM  is a challenging concept for law because 
it rests on  both the artefact’s pedigree (see section 2) and the 
artefact’s behavior (see section 3). These are two separate yet 
intertwined elements in the process of mimicking human 
behavior. In the case of driverless cars considered above, it was 
shown how human behavior reinforces the artefact’s pedigree, 
while at the same time the artefact’s behavior can occur without 
any human involvement.   
Therein lies the heart of the argument put forth here: the 
understanding of what robotic “intelligence” is by legal scholars is 
often limited; to this shortcoming one should add the increased 
complexity of modern techniques like RL and deep algorithms in 
AI that lead to a difficult conundrum; importantly, this conundrum 
cannot be addressed purely with metaphors as it is often the case 
for other questions that are new to legal research (Calo 2016). 
Earlier, we considered different levels of automation in machine 
learning algorithms and different shades of human agency inbuilt 
in systems using deep learning. This led us to conclude that tools 
for legal assessment that are currently available (e.g. Vienna 
Convention) are expected to be unable to capture the different 
levels of automation and human-machine interaction. For 
example, RL is often characterized by an opaque mechanism of 
decision making: although RL robots bear anthropomorphic 
features, it is still not clear to the lawmaker how to deal with this 
emergent concept of “assimilated personhood”. In this final part, 
the paper explores the necessity for a new concept of personhood 
together with algorithmic transparency in ADM and attempts to 
show how modern machine learning algorithms like RL present us 
with new challenges that require novel sets of standards.  
  
4.1. Artificial Personhood v. Simulated 
Personhood: Focusing on “the loop”  
 
 (Gray 1921) defined personhood as the quality of any entity 
possessing “intelligence and will”.  The idea that AI systems 
should be given entitlements to personhood is hardly a new one: 
there is already rich literature (Allan and Widdison, 1996; Kerr 
and Millar, 2001; Chopra and White, 2011) that suggests that 
autonomous artificial agents could potentially be considered as 
entities meriting “legal” personhood.   
This is not the first time that entities other than a person are 
entitled to the responsibilities and rights associated with the 
notion of personhood. The concept of a “fictitious” notion of 
personhood applying to entities other than human individuals has 
long been supported by many famous jurists such as Von Savigny 
and Blackstone (Dewey, 1925), and accounts for the nature of an 
artificial personality reserved for corporations (Hallis,1930), 
which is now embraced in most legal systems. Not surprisingly, 
this finds its roots in the Roman law tradition, where the doctrine 
of “persona ficta”, served the purpose of distinguishing monks to 
monasteries in canon law, avoiding thereby any structural 
deficiencies of the latter: lacking in soul but made of individuals, 
who could still be held guilty of delict.  
 In the early 19th century, the US Supreme Court in Dartmouth 
described corporations as “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, 
and existing only in contemplation of the law”, which displays in 
fact certain personhood virtues, not as a person but as a “mere 
creature of law.” (Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 
636 (1819). Since then, modern corporate law has developed a 
more nuanced approach, acknowledging that these entities - being 
the creation of private initiative and market forces- incorporate 
competing interests that need to be accounted for (Kaeb 2015). In 
a similar vein, robots and artificial agents are highly automated 
systems that are equally premised on “private initiative and 
market forces” and would therefore fit the criteria of “legal 
personhood” as such. In the era of algorithms being the driving 
force behind unmanned systems that could inflict harm, like 
military drones,  it is imperative not to afford them “the blessings 
of perpetual life and limited liability” (Rehnquist dissenting in 
Pellotti with regard to banking corporations).  
 This proposition has of course not gone without criticism: 
automated systems cannot experience life as a good to itself given 
their lack of consciousness (Aleksander 1994; Franklin 1995) and 
would fall beyond the strict confinements of liability as a 
punishment aiming at deterrence (Bentham, 2009). Such 
arguments however oversimplify the way in which automated 
systems operate and do not carefully consider the various levels of 
automation, as described above. Solum (1992) has therefore 
disregarded these claims as purely “behavioristic approaches” and 
has urged for a distinction between simulated and artificial 
intelligence. This would be a good first step towards addressing 
some of the most complicated regulatory problems posed by AI: 
limited foreseeability of actions, operations based on a highly 
compartmentalized and opaque design, and a narrow scope of 
controlled tasks, are only a few examples that demonstrate the 
need to fully grasp the contours of “intelligence” in AI (Scherer, 
2016).  
  
4.2. The “Intelligence and Will” in Deep 
Learning: An Interpretation of Opacity   
  
We saw earlier, that deep learning algorithms for ADM have 
an intricate architecture, are often opaque and allow for various 
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levels of human-machine interaction and autonomy. In other 
words, they are much more complex and less transparent than 
earlier rule- based algorithms, however, this additional complexity 
has not adequately been taken into account in their legal 
assessment to date. We also suggested that such intricacies render 
the understanding the concept of “personhood” associated with 
ADM algorithms problematic.    
Previously, we associated personhood with any entity 
possessing “intelligence and will”. A highly sophisticated and 
automated system can be considered to possess “personhood” but 
in what ways is the system “intelligent” and has “will”? 
Furthermore, the system was designed by a programmer and 
might sometimes be influenced by the user. Both the programmer 
and the user have their one distinct “personhoods”, so how do 
they interfere with the “system’s personhood”?  
We here propose that to address the above difficult questions 
one needs to  adopt a legal approach that will focus on both what 
the infrastructure and behavior of the automated system is and 
what the role of  the human element (programmer, user) might be, 
see also (Jones, 2015). This means that one needs to go beyond 
older approaches that put too much emphasis on how (i) efficient   
(cf Citron, 2007) and  (ii) objective the algorithm is (Zarsky, 
2015) without at the same time considering what the potential role 
of the human influence might be. As we saw earlier, this influence 
can be important for the algorithms output; for example, it might 
introduce biases in the outputs of the automated decision process.   
Dissecting the role of the human element is not an easy task, 
because, as we saw earlier, human influence might be hidden 
behind opaque architectures of the sort used in deep learning or 
might be indirect in the case of human-in-the-loop applications.  
This might be important for the correct legal assessment of 
liability and similar issues in modern ADM: if one neglects the 
influence of the programmer or operator, she runs the chance of 
not correctly attributing to humans flaws in the ADM algorithms 
for which the humans should be held responsible. Of course, the 
opacity of the algorithms does not render this an easy task 
especially for legal scholars; however only by taking a deeper 
look into the ADM mechanics could we have any hope of 
properly understanding   concepts like personhood and liability 
associated with highly automated systems.   
A good number of scholars (Pasquale, 2015; Citron and 
Pasquale, 2014; Crawford and Schultz, 2014; Zarsky, 2016) are 
currently focusing their critique towards the high levels of opacity 
and urge the law to “open the black box of algorithms” or even set 
up a body of independent auditors to carefully examine ADM 
(Sandvig et al., 2014). In section 2 above, we saw that one 
important aspect of this opacity that can perhaps be easily 
quantified is the “bias” introduced by the programmer to the 
ADM algorithm: this referred to some feature selection or similar 
process that crucially affects the output (decision) of the algorithm 
and which results from the programmer’s direct input at the stage 
of designing the algorithm. We agree with the aforementioned 
scholars about the need to restore transparency as a much needed 
ex post measure to eliminate bias and evaluate human 
involvement and liability. Yet, we will argue, opening the black 
box of algorithms only sees part of the picture when it comes to 
modern ADM algorithms as it merely focus on the algorithms’ 
design. On the other hand, the “intelligence and the will” of the 
algorithm cannot be disconnected from its performance after the 
design process (and training) has been finalized: for example, 
when the driverless car has to navigate in real world conditions 
and interact with human agents (imagine such a car navigating 
through a street filled with other cars driven by humans). At that 
moment, the algorithm has its own personhood, mimics human 
behavior and perhaps continuously interacts with humans like a 
normal person would do. All these are emergent normative 
features that should be taken into careful consideration during 
proper legal assessment of deep learning algorithms: we argue 
that understanding the mechanics of these algorithms at the stage 
(level) of their design is insufficient and should be supplemented 
by the study of what the overall scope of human involvement at 
all stages might be including training and unsupervised or semi –
supervised performance. For example, consider a driverless car 
that is first trained in a racing track, then performs successfully in 
the highway and then is assisted by a human when navigating in 
narrower streets. Is it enough to merely study the technical details 
of the algorithms that are used and also try to embed morality in 
their design? We argue it is not, and suggest that the law should 
also attempt to define the “intelligence” or “smartness” 
(Hildenbrandt, 2015) of the algorithm as well as how this is 
affected by the subsequent human influence (after the algorithm is 
designed and training has been completed).  
  
5   From the Imitation Game to the Voigt-
Kampff Test - Towards an Updated Legal 
Understanding of Machine Intelligence and the 
Road Ahead 
  
This paper has attempted to provide a normative and legal 
grounding of the “intelligence” demonstrated in automated 
systems that rely on deep learning. This is highly relevant 
nowadays, as the technological advances in robotics and cognitive 
sciences have paved the way to more sophisticated systems that 
can act and in a completely autonomous manner. These systems 
demonstrate remarkable abilities to mimic human behavior: this 
can be happen in such unprecedented ways that interactions 
between algorithms and humans can be quite difficult to predict, 
e.g. consider Microsoft 2016’s apology on their official blog 
regarding their Chabot Tay, and its racist comments on Twitter. 
The law has therefore to inevitably adopt a new concept of 
personhood that will deal with behaviors of modern human-like 
agents. This concept should go beyond the scope of traditional 
(weak) AI and reconsider wha  “personhood” might be; also, how 
personhood can be described when  human-like autonomous 
agents that act in an “intelligent” manner, learn and evolve on 
their own interact with humans in real world environments.   
This unavoidably takes us down the treacherous road of 
providing definitions of concepts like “intelligence”; a tedious 
task in itself due to the relativity the concept bears. A simple 
question that comes to mind when one first tries to define this 
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concept is the following: is it a concept that can be understood in 
terms of a mechanism (or an algorithm) that generates certain 
(human-like) behaviors or is it a matter of a human perceiving an 
agent (a human or a machine) as intelligent? Although Turing’s 
original intention in ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ was 
to explore whether a computer can “imitate a brain” (Copeland, 
2004), he  then admitted to be skeptical as to how  the intelligence 
of a machine was to be perceived: “The extent to which we regard 
something as behaving in an intelligent manner” he noted (Turing, 
1950) “is determined as much by our own state of mind and 
training as by the properties of the object under consideration” 
(see also Minsky, 1988 for a similar view). In other words, Turing 
suggests that “intelligence” relates to how we perceive it in a 
manner remarkably similar to how the legal system operates: 
Turing’s “perception” of intelligence is akin to the principle of 
“interpretation”. The legal system tries to interpret human 
behaviors not to understand the mechanisms (algorithms) that 
might have generated them; this might be one reason why 
automated systems are not easily perceived in law and humanities 
in general. To address these shortcomings, theorists have sought 
to elucidate additional dimensions of machine intelligence, like 
consciousness (Floridi, 2005), along the same lines of the 
empathy test employed in Philip Dick’s fictitious Voigt-Kampff 
test (Dick, 1968). Whereas intelligent processing shall always be 
opaque, it is desirable to go past the prima facie 
anthropomorphism of automated systems and actually enhance 
our understanding of what their “intelligence” might be. Deep 
Learning for instance, might yield results that even the 
programmers cannot anticipate. We therefore suggest that our 
perception of machine intelligence should be enhanced; this could 
either happen ex ante (“at the input stage”) or ex post (“at the 
output stage”):  
  
(i) ex ante efforts could include monitoring or prescribing the 
algorithm’s design features and principles e.g. carefully 
selecting training data or initial weights so that they are 
consistent with legal or ethical constraints (Wallach and 
Allen, 2008). 
(ii)  ex post efforts on the other hand, refer mostly to the 
user’s interpretation and feedback after the algorithm has 
performed an intelligent function (taken a decision).  
 
In other words, we should be able to assess the system’s 
performance, i.e. the processing instead of simply reviewing the 
decision met. This is also important as it places ADM within the 
socio-legal context it belongs to. In this sense, it echoes Pagallo’s 
view that we need to deepen our understanding of how this 
interaction works in vivo rather than in vitro (Pagallo, 2016). 
Unlike Pagallo however, we suggest that instead of reserving de-
regulated zones to test these interactions, we might be able to 
assess risks (and thus draft secondary rules) based on the 
performance as a means and not as an end to regulating automata.  
Machine learning has reached such a sophisticated level that it 
could not only result in misrepresenting an automated system that 
passed  the Turing test as a human but importantly  escape 
liability due to the judiciary’s inability to attribute a concept of 
“personhood” to  the system (algorithm). What is suggested here 
is not that we put ourselves in the shoes of the designers or 
engineers to be able and understand a software agent’s 
action/result. It is rather a matter of perception of its capabilities 
and context, as a way of rationalizing “intelligence” in AI. This 
shall help us overcome the issue of unpredictability as “the overall 
interpretation of the SA’s behavior will be based upon the 
hypothesis that the SA is operating ‘‘rationally’’, by adopting 
determinations appropriate to the purposes assigned to it, on the 
basis of the information available to it, in the context in which it is 
going to operate, that is, such an interpretation will be based upon 
the intentional stance” (Sartor, 2009).  
This paper has sought to explore the challenges put forth by 
the application of modern machine learning algorithms like deep 
networks and reinforcement learning in the area of Automated 
Decision Making (ADM), which merits further research and 
consideration. We hope that our findings shall mobilize legal 
scholars and ethicists to undertake the difficult task of further 
dissecting the emergent normative features associated with ADM 
in the not so distant future.  
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